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Abstract
The loads associated with Hurricane Katrina led to the destruction or severe damage of
approximately 130,000 homes and over 200 deaths in the state of Mississippi. This paper
discusses the results of a field inspection of structural damage along the state’s Gulf Coast area
caused by this hurricane. It was found that reinforced concrete, steel frame, and heavy timber
structures generally performed well, with minimal structural damage. Precast concrete, light
frame wood, and bridge structures generally performed poorly. Non-structural components of all
building types, in particular facades and interior partitions subjected to storm surge, were
typically destroyed.

For various structures, the primary cause of failure was found to be

insufficient connection strength. A comparison of Katrina’s storm surge and wind loads is made
to those specified in current design standards. It was found that Katrina’s forces exceeded those
specified in design standards in many parts of the state.
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Introduction
Hurricane Katrina was among the worst natural disasters in U.S. history in terms of
geographical coverage, structural damage, and accompanying fatalities.

Katrina first made

landfall in south Florida on August 25, 2005 as a Category 1 hurricane, with wind speeds of
approximately 36 m/s and gusts to 40 m/s. Atmospheric and ocean conditions were conducive
to rapid intensification, which led to Katrina attaining major hurricane (Category 3) status on the
afternoon of the 26th. This intensification was also accompanied by an unusual expansion
outwards of hurricane-force winds, transforming the storm into a large hurricane typically only
seen in the Pacific Ocean. Continuing to strengthen and move northwards during the next 48
hours, Katrina reached maximum wind speeds of 76 m/s (172 mph) (Category 5) on the morning
of Sunday, August 28th. Katrina’s hurricane-force winds extended 192 km from the storm
center, and tropical storm-force winds 368 km outwards. As such, Katrina was significantly
larger than Hurrican Camille, the benchmark used for Gulf of Mexico hurricanes hitting the
Mississippi coast since August 17, 1969. Though Camille had peak wind speeds of 84 m/s,
Katrina moved slower than Camille, thereby increasing the storm surge potential and time of
wind exposure.
Katrina made landfall on the morning of August 29 in Buras, LA, with a central pressure
of 923 mb, the 4th lowest on record in the U.S. for a landfalling Atlantic storm. The size of the
hurricane caused unprecedented destruction, resulting in a record storm surge in southeast
Louisiana, coastal Mississippi, and coastal Alabama, and a wide swath of damage for the same
region but extending over 200 km inland in some regions. In Mississippi, about 68,000 homes
were destroyed, and another 65,000 suffered major damage. As of this writing, the total death
toll is between 1,300 and 1,400, with thousands more still unaccounted for. Between 200 and
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250 deaths occurred among residents of the Mississippi coastal area. This places Katrina fifth in
terms of hurricane fatalities, and the strom is the sixth deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history.
Several weeks after the hurricane struck, in the last week of October 2005, a team of
researchers from Mississippi State University traveled along the coast on State Highway 90 from
Biloxi, MS to Waveland, MS, to survey and document the structural damage (White et al. 2006.)
This route represents approximately two-thirds of the Mississippi coast and includes some of the
most highly-damaged areas. All cities along this route were surveyed, including Waveland, Pass
Christian, Long Beach, Gulfport, and Biloxi (Fig. 1.) The purpose of this paper is to summarize
these findings.

Hurricane Action
There are two primary types of loads that structures must content with when exposed to
hurricanes. Water loads are created as a result of increases in water level and include the forces
resulting from the movement of water onto land as an area becomes inundated. Wind loads
develop sustained and dynamic conditions as a result of the hurricane’s winds, as influenced by
topography, ground cover, and adjacent obstructions.

Water Loads
In the initial stages of the hurricane, structures very near the coastline may be subjected
to the impact of large surface waves. Much of this energy is absorbed as the waves break in
shallow water approaching land, however. As time progresses, wind and wave action gradually
raise the surface water level and propel the water further inland, resulting in a storm surge. A
secondary contribution to surge is from the reduced barometric pressure within the storm, which
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causes a dome of water higher than the surrounding ocean. The surge rises gradually at first,
then more rapidly as the storm makes landfall. Thus, the storm surge is relatively gradual and
does not occur as a tidal wave, though the large wind-generated waves moving on top of the
surging waters may create this impression.
The surge typically lasts several hours and affects about 160 km of coastline. Storm
surge elevations typically vary from 1.5 to 7.5 m depending on a variety of hurricane conditions.
At this stage, shoreline structures are subjected to a water head and associated lateral as well as
buoyancy loads. The large waves associated with the raised water level during the storm surge
may now cause significant structural damage. These waves no longer break offshore but travel
over the land surface and may break upon coastline structures. This high wave action is perhaps
the most severe structural load during the storm, and is the cause of most of the damage reported
in this paper. Additional associated loads include hydrodynamic forces, water-borne debris
impact, and foundation erosion.
Factors which affect storm surge elevation include: storm size; storm central pressure
(lower interior atmospheric pressure increases the water level); maximum wind speed;
bathymetry (as the surface currents driven by the wind reach shallow coastlines, bottom friction
impedes the seaward return flow near the bottom, causing water to pile up; shallow areas with a
gradual slope such as the Mississippi coastline will experience greater storm surges); speed of
the system (as a slow moving hurricane has a longer time to transport water onshore, slow
systems are associated with higher storm surge); wave setup (the super-elevation required to
drive the underflow, which can be quite large in hurricane conditions); and track angle (storms
which make landfall perpendicular to the coastline generally produce larger storm surges.) The
strength of the surge in Mississippi was unexpected because the storm was slightly weaker than
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Hurricane Camille in 1969. However, Camille came from the south-southeast direction, whereas
Katrina slammed inland directly from the south along the Louisiana-Mississippi border, probably
the worst possible track for Mississippi. Katrina also moved a little slower than Camille,
allowing more time for the water to pile up. Although not directly a cause of the storm surge,
Katrina’s impact also began at high tide, which added approximately one foot to the surge.

Wind Loads
Wind is fundamentally driven by differences in pressure, and there are several types of
high-force winds that accompany a hurricane. Hurricane intensity is defined by sustained winds,
which is the average wind speed over a specified period of time at 10 m above the ground. In the
Atlantic, this averaging is performed over a one-minute period. Wind gusts typically last for less
than 20 seconds and are usually from 1.25 to 1.65 times larger than sustained winds, depending
on topography. Note that ASCE 7 (2003) considers the average wind speed over three seconds a
design wind gust. Some wind gusts are caused by downbursts, a strong downdraft that exits the
base of a thunderstorm and spreads out at the earth's surface.
As hurricanes make landfall, interactions with the thunderstorms form columns of rapidly
rotating air that may contact the ground and develop tornadoes. Officially 11 hurricane-related
tornadoes were reported in Mississippi, though there were several dozen additional unofficial
reports of tornado sightings. Finally, mesovortices may form in major hurricanes, which are
whirling vortices that form at the boundary of the eyewall and eye where there is a tremendous
change in wind speed. Mesovortices are often five to ten times wider than a tornado, with wind
speeds up to 90 m/s. Little information is available on mesovortex formation in Katrina, but
possible mesovortices were identified in the eyewall by satellite imaging.
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High winds primarily damage roofs and exterior structural components, but generally
pose much less of a threat to structures than storm surge and wave action, which can produce
loads orders of magnitude higher, and are severe enough in many cases to destroy entire
structures. An additional load associated with high wind is air-borne debris impact.

Damage Observations
Three general types of structures were surveyed: commercial buildings, residential
(apartment buildings and single-family homes), and select pieces of the civil infrastructure
(bridges). For this study, observations are grouped into construction type (bridges, reinforced
concrete buildings, steel buildings, and wood buildings) rather than occupancy type. Unless
otherwise noted, the damage described occurred to buildings located close to the coastline
(generally within several hundred meters of the coast), and was due to storm surge.

Bridges
Biloxi Bay Bridge
Constructed as a 2.4 km, 4-lane prestressed concrete highway bridge, the Biloxi Bay
Bridge was part of US 90 and connected Biloxi to Ocean Springs (Fig. 1.) All of the spans of the
bridge’s superstructure (i.e. deck and girders) were raised and pushed in a northeasterly
direction, dropping the west side of the superstructure from the supporting pier (Fig. 2.) The
piers below appear undamaged, and many of the spans are not damaged severely. The bridge
girders were not constrained to the bearings (Fig. 3), and the surge simply lifted the spans from
the supports. Thus it appears that connection inadequacy was the cause of failure. A significant
contributing factor may be the buoyant force. Given that submerged concrete has its self-weight
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effectively reduced by over 40%, as well as the possibility of air being trapped under the deck
between adjacent girders as the surge rises, the failure is not surprising. The surge also caused
significant scour beneath the road on top of the abutments as well as the abutments themselves
(Fig. 4.)

Bay St. Louis Bridge
This was a 3.2 km prestressed concrete bridge that spanned from Pass Christian to Bay
St. Louis (Fig. 1) This bridge lost all of its spans as they were pushed completely off of the pier
supports (Fig. 5.)

There was some pier damage as well. As all spans separated from the piers

at the bearings and the visible spans appear intact, inadequate bearing up-lift strength was the
cause of failure, as with the Biloxi Bridge. In this case, the bearing was apparently tied to the
superstructure but the strength of the connection as well as its embedment into the pier was
simply inadequate (Fig. 6.) Serious scour was also observed (Fig. 7.)

Reinforced Concrete Structures
Nearly all of the reinforced concrete (RC) structural frames that were identified appeared
to have performed well, with no apparent displacement, damage, or visible cracks.

However,

this was not the case for building façades or interior walls, as these were often significantly
damaged or entirely missing from the structure if it were struck by the storm surge. Figure 8
presents a typical structurally-undamaged low-rise RC frame.

Figure 9 illustrates another

common RC structure on the Mississippi coast, where a slab and column system is used to
support and elevate a wood structure above. In this instance, the wood structure was completely
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destroyed. A private residence composed of an RC frame as well as RC exterior walls sustained
no apparent damage to the frame or exterior walls (Fig. 10.)
On some buildings, the destruction of the façade and interior partitions may have
alleviated more severe damage by preventing an extreme storm surge load to be transferred to
the structural frame. Similar to the smaller-scale structures, high-rise (10+ story) RC buildings
on the coast often had the contents of the first one or two floors removed by the surge, but the
upper floors as well as the entire structural frame appeared to have sustained no damage. Figure
11 represents a typical structure of this type. It may be expected that the larger RC buildings
would survive as compared to smaller structures, as lower-floor member capacities are clearly
greater than those composing 1-3 story buildings. Increased building mass may also serve to
resist displacement due to wave impact as well as lateral-pressure induced sliding.

However,

based on the observed failures of other types of structures, the authors contend that it is not
primarily member capacity nor building mass but rather the connection strength of RC that lead
to the survival of these structures.
One of the two observed RC failures was the collapse of columns holding what may have
been a pergola roof. These columns failed at the base, a failure which may have been mitigated
if stirrups were placed in the columns to provide confinement (Fig. 12.) The other observed
damaged RC building (Fig. 13) appears to have been struck by a large casino barge that washed
onto the shore (not shown in the Figure), where only the impacted corner was damaged but the
remainder of the structure was unaffected.

The local damage appears to have been well-

contained and did not visibly propagate to additional structural members.

Although no

additional RC failures were identified in this study, others have reported a small number of RC

8

structural failures (Roberson et al. 2006). These include flat and pre-stressed concrete building
slabs, which may have failed due to moment reversals caused by the storm surge uplift.

Precast Concrete Structures
Unlike the RC structures, many of the precast concrete (PC) buildings observed sustained
significant structural damage. The members themselves appear to have had sufficient capacity,
however, as all observed failures occurred at the connections. Figure 14 shows an RC frame
upon which PC floor slabs were placed. Although the RC frame was undamaged, the PC slabs
appeared to have detached at the connections and slid to the northwest. Figure 15 shows a
collapsed structure composed of PC girders supported by RC columns. This structure appears to
have been used to support a wood superstructure. Here again the PC members were undamaged
but failures occurred at the connections. A detail of the failed connection is shown in Figures 16
and 17. A PC pedestrian bridge is also shown to have failed at the connections (Fig. 18.) Here
both girders were detached from the supporting column, and the canopy detached from the
girders (which served as guardrails), with the steel connectors still visible on the top of the
girders. The second floor of a PC parking structure failed (Fig. 19) when the deck T-sections
were pulled from their supports on the spandrel beam. Some spandrel beams supporting the
second floor also collapsed. As with the observed bridge failures, buoyancy likely was a
significant factor. Here again the primary cause of failure appeared to be a lack of sufficient
connection strength rather than member capacity.

It should be noted that other damage surveys

have identified failed PC members in parking garages, apparently due to a moment reversal
caused by the surge uplift force, as occurred with the RC slab failures identified (Roberson et al.
2006). In these cases, increasing connection strength alone may not have prevented the failures.
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Steel Frame Structures
Similar to the RC structures, most steel frames appeared to have survived intact, with
little or no damage. As with the RC structures, this does not include the façade and interior
walls, whether made of masonry, wood, or steel studs.

Figures 20-23 show typical such

structures. There were some exceptions, however. Figure 24 shows a collapsed steel frame.
Here the metal roof as well as the supporting purlins were bent upward, perhaps by wind,
resulting in a loss of lateral stability that caused the first frame to collapse inward. Open web
steel joist construction did not perform as well as wide-flange or built-up steel frame
construction, a structural type for which several failures were observed. Figure 25 illustrates
such a collapse. Here it appears that the far wall was toppled by the surge, causing the roof to
collapse. Based on failures similar to those shown in Figure 24, as well as the observation that
most steel frame failures occurred for structures with relatively slender members, it appears that
the primary area of concern for the performance of steel structures under hurricane loads is
stiffness and lateral stability rather than insufficient member capacity.

Wood Structures
As a rule, light-frame wood structures along the coastline were almost entirely destroyed.
The typical remains of coastline residence is shown in Fig. 26, where sub-structural columns
(often made of heavy-timber or RC) survived but the supported house did not. Unfortunately,
large numbers of images such as this line the Mississippi coast. Primary failures were at the
nailed connections, as searching through debris piles revealed that most of the wood members
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were intact. For wood structures that were not destroyed by storm surge, several common types
of damage were seen:
1. Roof failures. This generally occurred away from the coastline where the water surge
was not great enough to topple the structure. As expected, roof damage typically occurred
near the edges rather than central portion of the roof, where uplift forces are highest. The
sheathing panels appeared to have lifted whole from the roof, indicating a lack of
connection strength rather than panel bending capacity. Figure 27 presents a commonlyobserved type of roof sheathing failure. This observation was experimentally verified as
well (Schiff et al., 1996). Higher winds produced more extensive damage to the roof
structure itself, which was also frequently observed (Fig. 28.)

2. Siding and wall sheathing failures. As noted previously as being common on steel
frame and RC frame buildings as well, siding and sheathing stripped from the structure is
primarily a sign of wind damage (Fig. 29), though more extensive damage to sheathing
may indicate high water loads. Again, most losses of siding are indicative of insufficient
fastener strength.
3. Side-sway failures. Figure 30 is representative of this type of failure. Of the three
general types of light-frame wood structure failures observed, these were much less
common than the other two outlined above. The loss of lateral stability could have been
induced either by a wind or storm surge overload.

Unlike light-frame construction, heavy timber and glued-laminated frame structures
appeared to have fared as well as steel and RC.

Of course the connection strength (typically
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bolted) and member stiffness are much greater than those associated with the dimensional
lumber in light-frame construction. Common timber structural systems that survived were postand-beam pier substructures used to support a light-frame wood house above (Fig. 31.) Other
structures included docks (Fig. 32) and glued-laminated frames (Fig. 33.) Although damage was
observed on some of these systems, in general it appeared to be minimal.

Comparison to Current Standards
ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures (ASCE 2002),
provides design loads for wind and storm surge loads, and ASCE 24, Flood Resistant Design
and Construction (ASCE 2002), provides additional guidance to mitigate storm surge.

Most

building codes, such as the International Building Code (2003) and International Residential
Code (2003) incorporate ASCE 7 and 24 standards directly or by reference (note as of this
writing, ASCE 7, ASCE 24, the IBC and IRC are in the process of being revised to interface
more closely and the most current editions should be available in early 2006).

Storm Surge
Observations and data on Katrina’s storm surge cycle generally do not exist because all
of the tide gauges failed along the Mississippi coast as a result of the storm. Storm surge heights
are thus estimated from computational simulation and post-storm high-water mark
measurements. High water mark surveys were conducted by a variety of agencies, including the
National Weather Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, the US Geological Survey, and private
companies.

Surge values between 8.5 and 9.4 m have been documented between Pearlington

and Bay St. Louis, MS. High water marks between 6 and 8.2 m occurred between Bay St. Louis
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and Biloxi (Fig 1.) Ocean Springs and Pascagoula experienced smaller but still significant surge
values ranging from 3.6 to 5.8 m (White et al. 2006.)
Data from simulations predicting water levels are producing similar values. The results
of numerical simulation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Advanced Circulation (ADCIRC)
fully nonlinear hydrodynamic model (Luettich and Westerink 2000) are compared to observed
water marks in Table 1. The table also presents Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) Base Flood Elevations (BFE) found on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) to the
observed and simulated high-water levels for four communities along the Mississippi Gulf Coast.
The BFE represents the water level associated with a flood that has a 1% probability of
occurrence each year. In typical cases, ASCE 7 and ASCE 24 reference the FEMA BFE to the
Design Flood Elevation (DFE). In each case considered in Table 1, the BFE was exceeded
(typical along the coastline). Coastal high water elevations along the Mississippi Gulf Coast in
most areas varied from Waveland to Gulfport from approximately 7.5-9 m, and from Gulfport to
Pascagoula from about 4.5-6 m. In contrast, FEMA BFEs along the coast from Waveland to
Gulfport varied from 3.3-5.8 m, while from Gulfport to Pascagoula ranged from 2.7-6 m (White
et al. 2006.)
The estimated difference in storm surge design loads caused by the observed storm surge
levels in Table 1 and the FEMA BFEs are shown in Table 2. Design loads (unfactored) are
computed for a typical single-story house with a peak roof height of 4.5 m, using the simplified
procedure outlined in ASCE 7 Section 5. Here surge load is taken as the sum of a hydrostatic
component (approximately 15% of total load), a hydrodynamic component (5%), and wave
impact (80%). The procedure outlined in ASCE 7 assumes a stillwater depth of 65% of the BFE
and a wave height of 78%. In the sample calculations, water velocity is taken as 3 m/s (upper
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limit for the simplified design procedure), coefficient of drag is taken as 1.25 (minimum
allowed), and the building is assumed to be in importance category 2 (typical for a residence),
with dynamic pressure coefficient equal to 2.8. The building is assumed to be enclosed. Results
in Table 2 are given in terms of force per unit length on the exterior building wall facing the
surge. As seen in Table 2, estimated Katrina storm surge levels result in significantly larger
forces (from 1.4 to 4.0 times) than those based on the pre-storm BFEs. The large difference is
primarily due to the wave load, which is a function of the square of water depth.

Wind Gusts
Figure 34 shows superimposed ASCE 7 basic design wind speed gusts to wind gusts
estimated for Hurricane Katrina.

The Katrina wind gusts

were estimated by numerical

simulation from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Atlantic
Oceanography and Meterology Lab H*Winds models, as well as in situ data collection (White et
al. 2006.) Wind data collected from weather stations generally revealed lower gust speeds than
the NOAA estimate, as shown in Table 3. The estimates are within reasonable agreement,
however. As shown in Figure 34, the design winds are exceeded in a relatively narrow swath of
land in the southeastern portion of the state.

The maximum difference between the estimated

Katrina wind speeds and the design wind speed is approximately 13 m/s, and occurs just south of
the 49 m/s wind design speed contour, where the peak of the estimated 63 m/s wind gust contour
appears.

Based on the example residence above, assuming a 20 degree (approximately 4:12

pitch) gable roof in typical exposure C topography with importance factor 1.0, design wind
pressures (unfactored) are given in Table 4 for a 49 m/s and 63 m/s wind. Values are computed
using Method I in ASCE 7, a simplified analytical procedure. Considering both the main wind

14

resisting structural system as well as components and cladding, the Katrina-estimated 63 m/s
wind is expected to apply lateral pressures of approximately 1.6 times those of the 49 m/s design
wind.

Conclusions and Recommendations
The performance of a variety of building types along the Mississippi coast exposed to the
extreme loads imposed by Hurricane Katrina was summarized in this study. Based on these
observations, several recommendations can be made.

1. Explore current land use policy. As most structural damage was caused by storm surge, the
concentration should be on water loads rather than wind loads. Several possibilities should be
considered with regard to land use and water loads, including restricting certain construction or
building occupancy types, or increasing construction standards in certain areas.

Many of these

decisions have been already made, or are currently under consideration, by local authorities.

2. Reconsider design loads. Two issues are important: rate of return and the expected load.
Considering the rate of return, a 100-year (i.e. 1% chance of a flood of this magnitude per year)
flood is the typical rate of return used for flood design, while a 50-year wind is the basis for wind
gust consideration. A determination must be made whether this rate of return adequate, or to
consider a longer (or shorter) period of time. Considering the expected load associated with the
rate of return, it would also be prudent to investigate whether the current hurricane design loads
sufficiently reflect the actual imposed loads. A re-consideration of the appropriate design flood
elevation should be made, as many coastal base flood elevations were significantly exceeded. As
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of this writing, FEMA is in the process of updating BFEs. Similar to water loads, wind speeds
were significantly exceeded in many parts of the state as well.

3. Maintain consistency in safety level. From a structural safety point of view, it makes little
sense for structures of the same importance to be designed to different levels of reliability. The
goal of a design standard is not only to ensure a minimum level of safety, but also to ensure
consistency in reliability, the primary issue that Load and Resistance Factor Design standards
attempt to address. This fundamental goal is difficult if not impossible to achieve if consistent
standards are not enforced. Unlike its neighboring states, Mississippi currently has no statewide
design standard.

4. Address specific hurricane design and construction standards for the various building types.
It appears that most structural frames of steel, reinforced concrete, heavy timber, and gluedlaminated wood performed well during the storm surge. With the possible exception of a lateral
stability concern for steel frames and uplift loads which may cause negative moments for some
concrete structures, this suggests that existing design and construction practices for these types of
structures may be adequate. It is advisable to verify this adequacy under the expected storm
surge loads, however, with particular regard to assessment of safety level. Conversely, precast
concrete structures exposed to the storm surge load did not perform well. Member capacity
generally appeared adequate but connection strength was often insufficient.

Thus, it is

recommended to investigate the adequacy of connection design strength.
Observations made for this study also suggest that bridge superstructures had adequate
capacity. As with precast concrete buildings, a lack of connection restraint caused the observed
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failures.

An investigation of bearing connection strength is recommended. Most light-frame

wood structures subjected to storm surge were destroyed. It appears that most failures occurred
at the fasteners. However, it is not known whether strengthened connections alone would have
resulted in substantial decreases in damage, as overall structural system resistance to a lateral
load such storm surge is much less than that found in the survived commercial-grade frames.
An investigation to determine the desired and current design strengths is recommended, and how
the gap between these can be closed. Particular attention should be paid to fastener strength.
Finally, facades of all types in general did not perform well.

Here two design

possibilities exist: facades are either designed to withstand storm surge or they are designed to
break away to avoid overloading the structure. The latter case may be most appropriate for the
lower floors of most coastline structures. Once a desired level of performance is determined,
numerous ways exist to achieve this level with a variety of façade types.
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Table 1. Comparison of Base Flood Elevations and Katrina High Water Levels
MS Location
FEMA
Observed Katrina Simulated Katrina
BFE (m)
Water Level (m)
Water Level (m)
Pass Christian
3.9-5.5
7.6
7.6-9.1
Bay St. Louis
3.9-5.2
8.2
7.6-9.1
Gulfport
5.5
6.7
7.6-9.1
Pascagoula
3.0-3.9
3.6-5.2
4.5-6.1

Table 2. Comparison of BFE and Estimated Actual Surge Loads
MS Location
BFE Load Estimated Actual
Actual /
(kN/m)
Load (kN/m)
BFE
Pass Christian
854
1591
3.5 - 1.9
Bay St. Louis
767
1825
4.0 - 2.4
Gulfport
458
1245
2.7
Pascagoula
458
767
1.4 - 1.7

Table 3. Estimated and Measured Wind Gusts
MS Location
Measured Gust Simulated Gust
(m/s)
(m/s)
Waveland
54-58
64
Biloxi
49-51
44
Ocean Springs
47
44
Pascagoula
44
42

Table 4. Comparison of Design and Measured Wind Gust Pressures
Lateral Pressure on Main Wind Resisting Structural System, Walls
Wind Pressure
Location on Wall*
49 m/s Wind
63 m/s Wind
Ratio, (49) / (63)
Interior (region C)
1.03 (kN/m2)
1.66 (kN/m2)
1.61
Edges (region A)
1.54
2.49
1.62
Uplift Pressure on Components and Cladding, Roof
Wind Pressure
Location on Roof*
49 m/s Wind
63 m/s Wind
Interior (zone 1)
-1.13 (kN/m2)
-1.82 (kN/m2)
Edges (zone 2)
-1.90
-3.00
Corners (zone 3)
-2.78
-4.50

Ratio, (49) / (63)
1.61
1.58
1.62

*Specific locations for ”regions” and “zones” are defined in ASCE 7, Figures 6.2 and 6.3.
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Figure 1. Extent of survey along State Highway 90.

Figure 2. Collapsed Spans of Biloxi Bay Bridge.

Figure 3. Biloxi Bay Bridge bearings show lack of adequate connection to superstructure.
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Figure 4. Biloxi Bay Bridge road undermining.

Figure 5. Completely displaced spans of Bay St. Louis Bridge.
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Figure 6. Insufficient connection strength of Bay St. Louis Bridge bearings.

Figure 7. Bay St. Louis Bridge abutment undermining.
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Figure 8. Typical undamaged RC frame with destroyed façade and gutted interior.

Figure 9. Underside of a typical undamaged RC frame and slab, used to support a (destroyed)
wood building above.

Figure 10. Undamaged RC frame and exterior wall structure (private residence).
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Figure 11. Typical undamaged structure of high-rise RC frame, with first floor façade and
contents destroyed.

Figure 12. RC failed columns.
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Figure 13. RC frame building struck by casino boat.

Figure 14. Failed connections of PC slabs supported by a RC frame.
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Figure 15. Collapsed PC girder system.

Figure 16. Failed PC column connection.

Figure 17. Failed PC girder connection.
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Figure 18. Failed PC pedestrian bridge. Note detachment at connections.

Figure 19. Collapsed T-beams of PC parking structure.

Figure 20. Typical survived steel frame, with façade and interior contents removed by storm
surge.
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Figure 21. Typical survived steel frame.

Figure 22. Typical multi-story survived steel frame.

Figure 23. Survived steel frame.
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Figure 24. Steel frame lateral stability failure.

Figure 25. Failed steel frame with open-web joist roof.

Figure 26. Typical remains of wood structure, where only pier system survived.
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Figure 27. Typical wood roof sheathing failure. Note panel is removed whole and at roof edge.

Figure 28. Typical wood roof structural system failure.

Figure 29. Typical wood roof siding and sheathing failure.
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Figure 30. Wood house side-sway failure.

Figure 31. Typical timber beam and pier system.

Figure 32. Survived glued-laminated dock.
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Figure 33. Survived glued-laminated frame.

Figure 34. Code (horizontal contours) and Katrina (vertical contours) wind gusts (MPH).
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